Macroeconomics research has changed profoundly since the Kydland-Prescott seminal paper. In order to address the Lucas Critique, modelling now is based on microfoundations treating agents as rational utility optimizers. Bayesian estimation has produced models which are more data consistent than those based simply on calibra- JEL Classification: E52, E37, E58
Introduction
Thirty years ago Kydland and Prescott (1977) introduced the 'time-inconsistency' problem to the economics profession. In a nutshell, the problem they posed for policymakers is that in a world of forward-looking rational agents, an optimal policy announced at time t = 0 ceases to be optimal at every future point in time, t > 0. This creates an incentive to re-optimize and renege on earlier policy commitments. The original commitment therefore ceases to be credible. This feature holds even in the absence of uncertainty and even if policymakers are completely benevolent. In other words, if policymakers succumb to the temptation to renege, in a rational expectations world it will be anticipated and, at the same time, can be completely in the interests of the public.
The first thing to stress about time inconsistency is that it is a generic problem for policy-makers in all areas. For example, for regulated utility services like telecommunications there is a classic time inconsistency problem referred to as the 'hold-up problem'.
These services require large volumes of investment which, once installed become 'sunk assets' in the sense that most or all of them cannot be removed and used elsewhere or sold on second-hand markets at their original cost. In consequence, private investors are at risk of opportunistic behaviour by regulators particularly over prices, once the investments have been installed; and awareness by private investors of this regulatory risk drives up the required rate of return and the cost of capital. The latter dramatically reduces investment as has been seen in many countries. 1 However the time-inconsistency problem is mostly associated with macroeconomic policy, and in particular, monetary policy. Following Barro and Gordon (1983) that built on the ideas of Kyland and Prescott, a huge academic literature has grown that has been very influential with policymakers. The central message underlying these contributions are the existence of significant macroeconomic gains, in some sense, from 'enhancing credibility' through formal commitment to a policy rule or through institutional arrangements for central banks such as independence, transparency, and forward-looking inflation targets, that achieve the same outcome.
In addressing these policy issues, until quite recently macroeconomics suffered from two deficiencies: Keynesian models that featured real-world nominal rigidities, although capable of accounting for stylized facts, lacked micro-foundations and were therefore vulnerable to the Lucas Critique. Non-Keynesian, neo-classical models such as the Lucassupply curve, which lie at the heart of the literature spawned by Barro-Gordon, can be rigorously justified, but fail to account for the inflation persistence observed in the real-1 See Levine et al. (2005) 1 world data, at least in the high inflation era in the 1970s and 1980s. 2 The 'New Keynesian' (NK) models based on dynamic stochastic general equilibrium (DSGE) models can now claim to reconcile rigor and empirics.
The analysis of this paper uses a fairly standard NK model. Before proceeding it is appropriate to acknowledge and try to address some criticisms of this this form of model in the recent literature. There are essentially two strands to this critique both centred on the pricing model of 'Calvo contracts'. In order to capture inflation persistence NK models introduce an ad hoc form of price indexing to past inflation. With the inclusion of output persistence in the form of consumption habit, the resulting NK models have proved very successful at generating observed patterns of inertia in inflation, output and the nominal interest rate. Naturally on theoretical grounds, the introduction of such non-rational behaviour has been subjected to criticism. 3 . One response proposed by Collard and Dellas (2006) is to return to the Lucas story of misperceptions about monetary aggregates, while retaining the Calvo contract. This leads to a signal extraction problem which generates inflation persistence without the inclusion of any indexation scheme. Looking more generally at realistic information assumptions is certainly a promising future agenda for the DSGE literature. However there is a prior question: can data be reconciled with a NK model using real persistence mechanisms arising from habit, but without price indexing?
We address this question in our Bayesian estimation below.
The second source of criticism of the NK models is their failure to match microeconomic evidence on the frequency of price changes. 4 Two modifications to the Calvo contract are found in the literature that addresses this issue. The first allows statedependence in contracts; see for example, Gertler and Leahy (2004) ; the second introduces sectoral heterogenity in price stickiness. Both these approaches have the convenient property that the DSGE modeller can retain essentially the same form of NK Phillips curve, but with an interpretation of the underlying contract length that can be reconciled with the microeconomic evidence.
Returning to the earlier Barro-Gordon framework, in the essentially static model the welfare loss associated with a lack of credibility takes the form of a long-run inflationary bias. Whether this is a real problem or a non-problem (as argued by Blinder (1998) ) is open to question. For a dynamic models of the New Keynesian genre, such as that employed in 2 However as Bordo and Filardo (2004) , Minford (2006) and others have pointed out, inflation persistence in the world's major economies has declined in the current era of low inflation resulting in a significant improvement in the empirical performance of neo-classical models.
3 Indeed, Minford and Peel (2004) argue that if price-setters adjust prices based on expected rather than past inflation then this eliminates the NK Phillips curve all together! 4 See Angeloni et al. (2006) .
2 this paper, the influential review of Clarida et al. (1999) emphasizes the stabilization gain from commitment which exist whether or not there is a long-run inflationary bias. But what is the size of this stabilization gain from commitment?
One contribution of this paper is to answer this question using a standard DSGE model estimated by Bayesian methods. In doing so we address an important consideration, namely the existence of a zero lower bound for the nominal interest rate. Using a simple calibrated New Keynesian model, Adam and Billi (2007) show that ignoring this constraint on the setting of the nominal interest rate can result in considerably underestimating the stabilization gain from commitment. The reason for this is that under discretion the monetary authority cannot make credible promises about future policy. For a given setting of future interest rates, the volatility of inflation is driven up by the expectations of the private sector that the monetary authority will re-optimize in the future. This means that to achieve a given low volatility of inflation the lower bound is reached more often under discretion than under commitment. In our set-up, following Woodford (2003) , we approximate the zero lower interest rate bound with a constraint on the variability of the nominal interest rate. The central bank then chooses a positive long-run inflation target so has to avoid hitting the lower bound with a probability close to unity. This results to a form of "inflationary bias", but one resulting from the lower interest rate bound and not from the inefficiency of the natural rate of output. By contrast in Adam and Billi (2007) the interest rate frequently falls into the liquidity trap resulting in expectations of negative inflation and in a deflationary as opposed to our inflationary bias. The former phenomenon, highlighted by Krugman (1998) , is more applicable to countries such as Japan that have fallen into a liquidity trap than to the current low inflation and moderate interest rate environments witnessed in most countries. The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 sets out our New Keynesian model with persistent mechanisms taking the form of habit formation in consumption and labour supply and price indexing. A linearization of the model about a zero-interest steady state and a quadratic approximation of the representative household's utility sets up the optimization problem facing the monetary authority in the required LQ framework.
Section 3 uses Bayesian methods to estimate the model and variants where the indexing of prices and the two forms of habit formation are suppressed in turn.
Our welfare quadratic approximation assumes that the zero-inflation steady state is close to the social optimum (the 'small distortions case' of Woodford (2003) ). In section 4
we therefore assess the quality of this approximation. In doing this we examine a relatively neglected aspect of New Keynesian models that arises with the inclusion of external habit in consumption, namely that the natural rate of output and employment can actually be above the social optimum. The consequence of this is that for the purely deterministic problem, the more familiar "inflationary bias" that occurs in the deterministic optimal policy problem is negative and the tax wedge, up to a point, may be welfare-enhancing.
In section 5 we focus on the stochastic stabilization problem and address the question of the size of the stabilization gain from commitment. Section 6 explores the open-economy aspects of the time-inconsistency problem and Section 7 concludes the paper.
A DSGE Model with Structural Dynamics
Our model is essentially the influential model of Smets and Wouters (2003) 
Households
There are ν households of which a representative household r in the home bloc maximizes
where E t is the expectations operator indicating expectations formed at time t and β is the household's discount factor, C t (r) is an index of consumption, N t (r) are hours worked, H C,t and H N,t represents the habit, or desire not to differ too much from other households, and we choose H C,t = h C C t−1 , where
ν , where N t is aggregate labour supply defined after (3) below and h C , h N ∈ [0, 1). When h C = 0, σ > 1 is the risk aversion parameter (or the inverse of the intertemporal elasticity of substitution). u(G t ) is the utility from exogenous real government spending G t . We normalize the household number ν at unity.
The representative household r must obey a budget constraint:
where P t is a price index, D t (r) are end-of-period holdings of riskless nominal bonds with nominal interest rate i t over the interval [t, t + 1]. W t (r) is the wage, Γ t (r) are dividends from ownership of firms net of any lump-sum taxes and T t is a tax on labour income. 5 In addition, if we assume that households' labour supply is differentiated with elasticity of supply η, then (as we shall see below) the demand for each household's labour is given by
where
is an average wage index and N t is average employment.
Maximizing (1) subject to (2) and (3) and imposing symmetry on households (so that C t (r) = C t , etc) yields standard results:
(4) is the familiar Keynes-Ramsey rule adapted to take into account of the consumption habit. (5) equates the real post tax wage with the marginal rate of substitution between work and consumption, marked up to reflect the market power of households arising from their monopolistic supply of a differentiated factor input with elasticity η.
Firms
Competitive final goods firms use a continuum of non-traded intermediate goods according
to a constant returns CES technology to produce aggregate output
where ζ is the elasticity of substitution. This implies a set of demand equations for each intermediate good m with price P t (m) of the form
5 In fact as in Levine et al. (2007b) Tt can be interpreted as a total tax wedge.
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where 
where N t (r, m) is the labour input of type r by firm m and A t is an exogenous shock capturing shifts to trend total factor productivity (TFP) in this sector. Minimizing costs dm is price dispersion that leads to a cost of inflation.
For later analysis it is useful to define the real marginal cost as the wage relative to domestic producer price. Using (5) and Y t = A t N t this can be written as
Now we assume that there is a probability of 1 − ξ at each period that the price of each intermediate good m is set optimally to P 0 t (m). If the price is not re-optimized, then it is indexed to last period's aggregate producer price inflation. 6 With indexation parameter γ ≥ 0, this implies that successive prices with no re-optimization are given
objective is at time t to choose {P 0 t (m)} to maximize discounted profits
given i t (since firms are atomistic), subject to (7), where Q t+k is the discount factor over the interval [t, t + k] . The solution to this is
and by the law of large numbers the evolution of the price index is given by
6 Thus we can interpret 
Equilibrium
In equilibrium, goods markets, money markets and the bond market all clear. Equating the supply and demand of the consumer good we obtain
Assuming the same tax rate levied on all income (wage income plus dividends) a balanced budget government budget constraint
completes the model. As in Coenen et al. (2005) we further assume that changes in government spending are financed exclusively by changes in lump-sum taxes with the tax rate T t held constant at its steady-state value. Given interest rates i t , expressed later either in terms of an optimal or an Inflation Forecast-Based (IFB) rule, the money supply is fixed by the central banks to accommodate money demand. By Walras' Law we can dispense with the bond market equilibrium condition and therefore the government budget constraint that determines taxes τ t . Then the equilibrium is defined at t = 0 by
given past price indices and exogenous TFP
and government spending processes.
Zero-Inflation Steady State
A deterministic zero-inflation steady state, denoted by variables without the time subscripts, is given by
giving us in effect 7 equations to determine W P , i, C, N , Y , P P 0 and T . The natural rate of interest is determined by the private sector's discount factor. In our cashless economy the price level is indeterminate.
3 Bayesian Estimation
In this section we conduct a Bayesian estimation of the linearized form, about the steady state, of the model as in Batini et al. (2006) . We estimate the following model variants: A common theme in papers estimating DSGE models is the difficulty in pinning down the parameter of labour supply elasticity φ, inference on the inverse Frisch elasticity of labour supply has been found susceptible to model specifications, and exhibiting wide posterior probability intervals. (Batini et al. (2006) ) As a result, following Christiano et al. (2005) , the parameter φ is set to unity. They also argue that although this calibrated elasticity is low by comparison with the values assumed in the real business cycle literature, it is well within the range of point estimates reported in the labour literature.
(See, for instance, Rotemberg and Woodford (1999) ) For the remainder of parameters, as suggested by Castillo et al. (2006) , inverse gamma distributions are used as priors when non-negativity constraints are necessary, and beta distributions for fractions or probabilities. Normal distributions are used when more informative priors seem to be necessary.
The prior means and distributions of these parameters can be found in Table 2 .
All analysis is performed with the DYNARE (Matlab version) programme (Juillard (2006) ) 7 and Matlab. The IFB policy rule contained in the models is the one-quarter ahead 7 Version 3.064 of the package is available for downloading from the Dynare homepage:
http://www.cepremap.cnrs.fr/juillard/mambo/index.php 8 forward-looking rule 8 and we include estimation of the interest rate smoothing parameter.
In deviation form this is given by
In order to avoid a stochastic singularity when evaluating the likelihood function, Dynare requires at least as many shocks or measurement errors in the models as observable variables (i.e. requires that the covariance matrix of endogenous variables is nonsingular).
In this estimation an additional structural shock is included to capture, to some extent, aggregation effects (e.g. monetary policy shock) and measurement errors in the data.
The mode of the posterior is first estimated using the MATLAB's fmincon (and Chris
Sim's csminwel 9 ) after the models' log-prior densities and log-likelihood (Tables 2, 3 in Appendix B summarize the prior distributions, posterior means and medians and 90%
confidence intervals for the eight model specifications). The posterior median is calculated by sorting the draws from the marginal distribution of the parameters and computing the value of the median after the MCMC is finished. The marginal data density of each model is computed using the Geweke (1999) modified harmonic-mean estimator.
As shown in Table 3 in the Appendix B, estimates of the policy coefficients are fairly robust across specifications. As expected, the policy rule estimates imply a fairly strong response (θ) to expected inflation by the US Fed Reserve and the degree of interest rate smoothing (ρ i ) is substantial. All shocks from all the model variants are found fairly persistent and volatile except that the technology shock seems to be less persistent in the models without any habit formation (i.e. Models 1, 3, 4 and 7). As usual, monetary policy disturbances (ǫ e ) are less important in driving inflation, consumption and output. As also discussed in Batini et al. (2006) , the estimates of γ imply that inflation is intrinsically not very persistent in the relevant model specifications. The estimated mean and median 8 Our estimates are, in fact, insensitive to the inclusion of an output gap term in the rule or to assuming a current rather than forward-looking inflation feedback. 9 See, for more details, Chris Sim's homepage: http://www.princeton.edu/ sims/ values of around 0.995 for the stochastic discount factors are very close to the conventional calibrated value of β. On the demand side, it is found that both habit formations, especially consumption habit, seem to play an important role in the US economy. In addition, the risk-aversion parameter (σ) is very small when consumption habit is absent, indicating that the inter-temporal elasticity of substitution (proportional to 1/σ) may be quite large for Models 1, 3, 4 and 7. For Models 6 and 8 , the larger value of the slope of the Phillips curve (λ) corresponds to a smaller ξ which indicates that nominal rigidity and inertia in the price settings seems to be reduced. The median estimates for the real interest rate i * translate into a median value of around 0.995 for the stochastic discount factor which, in turn, implies plausible estimates for the degree of price stickiness based on the inferred values for the Phillips curve slope λ. Finally, the mean/median estimates of β, γ, λ determine the point estimates for the degree of price stickiness ξ, which is then found to be fairly strong and in accordance with the values estimated by Blinder et al.
(1998) and Rotemberg and Woodford (1998 The problem of Bayesian model comparisons is to use data to determine which of the eight competing models is closer to the 'truth'. We compare the posterior model probabilities given data, P (M/D), which is given by Bayes' theorem:
The key data-dependent term P (D/M ) is the marginal data density, which is produced by running DYNARE. Given that the prior probability of each model is assigned equal
The posterior odds ratio then satisfies:
and is normalized to
This is the bottom line of Table 2 which indicates that Model 2 (with consumption habit but no labour habit or price indexation) outperforms its 7 rivals. In the policy analysis of Section 5 we have therefore used the median parameter estimates of Model 2. However the performance when including labour habit persistence in improving model fit appears ambiguous to interpret. On the other hand, the second most restrictive model (Model 4, with only price indexation) seems to be worst supported by the data. These results clearly suggest that incorporating habit persistence in consumption in the US model imparts greater inertia to the model, and improves the fit.
Finally, in the introduction we asked whether can data be reconciled with a NK model without the controversial inclusion of price indexing. Our three model variants without 10 ξ is obtained by using λ ≡
; average contract length
price indexing, models 2, 3 and 5 have a combined probability of 0.63, suggesting that the answer to the question is in the affirmative. The habit persistence mechanism is sufficient on its own to impart both output and inflation inertia that enables our NK model to achieve a good fit with the data.
The Inflation Bias and Optimal Taxation
The natural rate of output is below the efficient rate because of monopoly power in output and labour markets, and external habit in labour supply. However, external habit in consumption works in the opposite direction. To see this we solve for the deterministic social planner's problem. 11 Using (1) the social planner chooses trajectories for output and inflation to maximize
At . The first-order condition for the choice out output is
The efficient steady-state level of output
From (15) to (19), after some manipulation, the steady-state level of output (the 'natural rate'), is given by
Comparing (26) and (25) 27) 11 Note that zero inflation with no welfare costs from the dispersion of labour demand across firms is socially optimal. 12 See Choudhary and Levine (2006) .
In the case where there is no habit persistence for both consumption and labour effort, (27) always holds. In this case tax distortions and market power in the output and labour markets captured by the elasticities η, ζ ∈ (1, ∞) drive the natural rate of output below the efficient level. If T = 0 and η = ζ = ∞, tax distortions and market power disappear and the natural rate is efficient. Another case when (27) always holds is where habit persistence for labour supply exceeds that for consumption; i.e., h N ≥ h C .
Our empirical estimates strongly suggest that h C > h N which leads to the possibility that the natural rate of output can actually be above the efficient level. To pursue this possibility there are two remaining parameters η and ζ to calibrate. 13 The mark-up of the real wage disposable wage on the marginal rate of substitution and the mark-up of the price on the marginal cost are given by respectively. Suppose we set these mark-ups as equal and defined by µ as one or other of 1.10, 1.15, 1.20 and 1.30. Then the optimal tax wedge that will equate the natural rate and socially optimal output levels in the steady state is given by
From Table 3 T * < 0, implying a subsidy to producers is required to reach the social optimum. We can use the estimated model probabilities to calculate the average tax wedge across all eight models and these are reported in the last row of Table 3 for each value of µ. Our conclusion is that given our estimates for for all models are the associated model probabilities, from a welfare perspective, the tax wedge is 'corrective' (in the words of Layard (2006)), rather than distortionary, and that the existing wedge in the US may actually be too low, though with an average optimal wedge in the region T * ∈ [0.49, 0.64] the Euro Area tax wedge is too high. The further implication is that the natural rate of output may be above the social optimum, so if we are to accept the Barro-Gordon argument, the inflationary bias may negative also. In view of these findings and the 'Blinder Critique' (Blinder (1998) ) of the inflation bias, 15 in what follows we focus solely on the stabilization gain from commitment.
13 An examination of the linearized form of the models reveals that η and ζ are not identified. 
where z t is a (n − m) × 1 vector of predetermined variables at time t with z 0 given, x t , is a m × 1 vector of non-predetermined variables and o t is a vector of outputs. A, B,
C and E are fixed matrices and ǫ t is a vector of random zero-mean shocks. Rational expectations are formed assuming an information set {z s , x s , ǫ s }, s ≤ t, the model and the monetary rule. z t consists of exogenous shocks, and lagged variables; x t consists of current inflation and consumption. x t also includes flexi-price outcomes for the latter two variables, and outputs o t consist of marginal costs, the marginal rate of substitution for consumption and leisure, labour supply, output, flexi-price outcomes, the output gap and other target variables for the monetary authority. Let
T be the vector of such target variables. For the welfare-based loss function discussed below, the inter-temporal loss function can be written in general form as
where the single-period loss function is given by
Imposing a Lower Interest Rate Bound Constraint
In the absence of a zero lower bound (henceforth ZLB) constraint on the nominal interest rate the policymaker's optimization problem is to minimize (31) subject to (29) and (30). Then complete stabilization of the output gap and inflation is possible, but if shock variances are sufficiently large this will lead to a large variability of the nominal interest rate and the possibility of it becoming negative. To rule out this possibility and to remain eliminating the inflationary bias.
within the convenient LQ framework of this paper, we follow Woodford (2003) , chapter 6, and approximate the ZLB effect by introducing constraints of the form
Woodford shows that the effect of these extra constraints is to follow the same optimization as before except that the single period loss function is replaced with
where w i > 0 if (33) binds (which we assume) and i * > 0 if monetary transactions frictions are negligible, but i * < 0 is possible otherwise (i.e., the interest rate must be lower than that necessary to keep inflation zero in the steady state). In what follows we put i * = 0.
This approach to the ZLB constraint in effect replaces it with a nominal interest rate variability constraint which ensures the ZLB is hardly ever hit. By contrast the work of a number of authors including Billi (2006, 2007) , Coenen and Wieland (2003) , Eggertsson and Woodford (2003) and Eggertsson (2006) study optimal monetary policy with commitment in the face of a non-linear constraint i t ≥ 0 which allows for frequent episodes of liquidity traps in the form of i t = 0. Of these, Adam and Billi (2007) is the only one to also study discretion and to address the issue of stabilization gains from commitment, but only for the simplest possible New Keynesian model. The application of their numerical methods to models with higher order dynamics, such as the one we study in this paper, would fall foul of the "curse of dimensionality" (Judd (1998) , chapter 7), which our LQ framework avoids. Moreover we are not so much studying monetary policy when faced with a liquidity trap, but rather the design of optimal rules that avoid excess volatility of the nominal interest rate that takes us into the trap in the first place. We return to this point later when we discuss our results.
Commitment Versus Discretion
To derive the ex ante optimal policy with commitment following Currie and Levine (1993) we maximize the the Lagrangian
with respect to {i t }, {y t } and the row vector of costate variables, p t , given z 0 . From Appendix A of Levine et al. (2007b) where more details are provided, this leads to a 14 optimal rule of the form
and the optimality condition 16 at time t = 0 imposes p 20 = 0. In (36) and (37) p T t = p T 1t p T 2t is partitioned so that p 1t , the co-state vector associated with the predetermined variables, is of dimension (n − m) and p 2t , the co-state vector associated with the nonpredetermined variables, is of dimension m. The loss function is given by
and S is the solution to the steady-state Ricatti equation. In (39) matrices S and N are partitioned conformably with y t = [z T t x T t ] T so that S 11 for instance has dimensions (n − m) × (n − m).
Note that in order to achieve optimality the policy-maker sets p 20 = 0 at time t = 0. At time t > 0 there exists a gain from reneging by resetting p 2t = 0. It can be shown that N 22 is negative definite, so the incentive to renege exists at all points along the trajectory of the optimal policy. This essentially is the time-inconsistency problem facing stabilization policy in a model with structural dynamics. The optimal rule (36) can be shown to consist of a feedback on the lagged predetermined variables with geometrically declining weights with lags extending back to time t = 0, the time of the formulation and announcement of the policy (see Levine et al. (2007b) ); in other words it is a rule with memory. The discretionary (time-consistent) policy essentially eliminates the memory element, and with it the incentive to renege along the equilibrium path, by posing a memoryless rule.
Technically, to evaluate the discretionary optimal policy we write the expected loss Ω t at time t as
The dynamic programming solution then seeks a stationary solution of the form i t = −F z t , Ω t = z T Sz and x = −N z where matrices S and N (completely unrelated to those defined for the commitment case) are now of dimension (n − m) × (n − m) and m × (n − m) respectively, in which Ω t is minimized at time t subject to (1) in the knowledge that a similar procedure will be used to minimize Ω t+1 at time t+1. 17 Both the instrument i t and the forward-looking variables x t are now proportional to the predetermined component of the state-vector z t and the equilibrium we seek is therefore Markov Perfect. We can set this out as an iterative process for F t , N t , and S t starting with some initial values. If the process converges to stationary values independent of these initial values, 18 F, N and S say, then the time-consistent feedback rule is i t = −F z t with loss at time t given by
Formulating the Policymaker's Loss Function
Although much of the optimal monetary policy literature has stayed with the ad hoc loss function that penalizes variances of the output gap and the inflation rate, a normative assessment of policy rules requires welfare analysis. For this, given our linear-quadratic framework, 19 we require a quadratic approximation of the representative consumer's utility function. A common procedure for reducing optimal policy to a LQ problem is as follows.
Linearize the model about a deterministic zero-inflation steady state as we have already done. Then expand the consumer's utility function as a second-order Taylor series after imposing the economy's resource constraint. In general this procedure is incorrect unless the steady state is not too far from the efficient outcome (see Woodford (2003) , chapter 6, Benigno and Woodford (2004) , Kim and Kim (2006) and Levine et al. (2007a) ). This is the 'small distortions' case in this literature. The analysis of section 4 suggests that with habit compensating for the negative distortions from market power and the tax wedge, the distortions are indeed small. In what follows we assume this, and for this case we show in Levine et al. (2007b) that a quadratic single-period loss function that approximates the 17 See Currie and Levine (1993) and Söderlind (1999) . 18 Indeed we find this is the case in the results reported in the paper. 19 We have emphasized the convenience of the LQ approach to optimal policy. However, recent developments in numerical methods now allow the researcher to go beyond linear approximations of their models and to conduct analysis of both the dynamics and welfare under commitment using higher-order (usually second-order) approximations (see, Kim et al. (2003) and for an application to simple monetary policy rules, Juillard et al. (2004) ). However for medium-large scale non-linear models, numerical computation of optimal policy with an interest rate ZLB and/or discretion faces the "Curse of Dimensionality" alluded to in section 5.2.
utility takes the form
where positive weights w c etc are defined as follows:
where c y is the steady state ratio C/Y . All variables are in log-deviation form about the steady state as in the linearization. 20
Results
From our discussion of the interest rate ZLB effect in section 5.2, the policymaker's optimization problem is to choose an unconditional distribution for i t (characterized by the steady state variance) shifted to the right about a new non-zero steady state inflation rate and a higher nominal interest rate, such that the probability, p, of the interest rate hitting the lower bound is very low. This is implemented by calibrating the weight w i for each of our policy rules so that z 0 (p)σ i < i where z 0 (p) is the critical value of a standard normally distributed variable Z such that prob (Z ≤ z 0 ) = p, i = 1 β − 1 + π * is the steady state nominal interest rate, σ i is the unconditional variance and π * is the new steady state inflation rate. Given σ i the steady state positive inflation rate that will ensure i t ≥ 0 with probability 1 − p is given by 21
In our linear-quadratic framework we can write the intertemporal expected welfare loss at time t = 0 as the sum of stochastic and deterministic components, Ω 0 =Ω 0 +Ω 0 .
By increasing w i we can lower σ i thereby decreasing π * and reducing the deterministic component, but at the expense of increasing the stochastic component of the welfare loss.
20 When there is no habit (hC = hN = 0) or government spending (cy = 1), ct = yt = lt − at and we end up with the loss function in Woodford (2003):
at is potential output achieved when prices are flexible. In this special case only, our the micro-founded welfare-based loss function is then of exactly the same form as the commonly used ad hoc formulation, give or take terms independent of policy. 21 If the inefficiency of the steady-state output is negligible, then π * ≥ 0 is a credible new steady state inflation rate. Note that in our LQ framework when zero inflation is occasionally hit the interest rate is allowed to become negative, possibly using a scheme proposed by Gesell (1934) and Keynes (1936) .
By exploiting this trade-off, we then arrive at the optimal policy that, in the vicinity of the steady state, imposes the ZLB constraint, i t ≥ 0 with probability 1 − p. Table 5 shows the results of this optimization procedure under commitment using the loss function given by (42) and based on parameter estimates for our favoured model 2.
We choose p = 0.025. Given w i , denote the expected inter-temporal loss (stochastic plus deterministic components) at time t = 0 by Ω 0 (w i ). This includes a term penalizing the variance of the interest rate which does not contribute to utility loss as such, but rather represents the interest rate lower bound constraint. Actual utility, found by subtracting the interest rate term, is given by Ω 0 (0). The steady state inflation rate, π * , that will ensure the lower bound is reached only with probability p = 0.025 is computed using (44).
Given π * , we can then evaluate the deterministic component of the welfare loss,Ω 0 . Since in the new steady state the real interest rate is unchanged, the steady state involving real variables is also unchanged, so from (42) we can write 22 results in a trade-off between reducing the stochastic component of policy at the expense of a higher steady state inflation rate and, therefore, a higher deterministic component of policy. In the absence of the ZLB constraint, the policymaker would not need to penalize the variability of i t and would optimize with w i = 0, achieving the minimum stochastic welfare loss ofΩ 0 (0) = 10.4 and a zero-inflation rate steady state. But this policy results in an unconditional steady state variance of the interest rate of σ 2 i = 1.57 with a resulting high probability of hitting the ZLB. To reduce this probability to 2.5%, optimal policy with w i = 0 must guide the economy to a non-zero inflation steady state of π * = 1.46% per quarter with a corresponding large non-zero deterministic welfare loss. As the weight w i increases, the steady state inflation rate falls at the expense of a higher stochastic component of the welfare until at w i = 7, highlighted in bold, we reach the optimal choice of w i that satisfies the ZLB constraint that a zero interest rate is reached with probability 2.5%. Table 6 performs a similar exercise for optimal discretionary policy. Note that with w i = 0, the unconditional variance, σ 2 i , under discretion is lower than that under commitment. To achieve the ZLB constraint then requires a larger steady state inflation under 22 Both the ex-ante optimal and the optimal time-consistent deterministic welfare loss that guide the economy from a zero-inflation steady state to π = π * differ fromΩ0(0) (but not by much because the steady state contributes by far outweighs the transitional contribution). From a timeless perspective (see Woodford (2003) , however, the policymaker will jump immediately to the new steady state justifying the use of (45).
commitment than under discretion and as a result the total welfare loss is actually higher.
However whereas under commitment the trade-off between a high steady-state inflation rate and a smaller stochastic welfare loss can be exploited to drastically reduce the ultimate loss, this is not the case under discretion and highlights an important difference between stabilization policy under commitment and discretion. For the latter we see that the steady-state inflation -stochastic welfare loss trade-off now vanishes. 23 As the weight on interest rate variability, w i , increases, both the unconditional variance of the interest rate, and the steady-state inflation rate needed to reduce the probability of hitting the ZLB to 2.5% increase, with the consequence that w i = 0 is now optimal. This is a somewhat counterintuitive result that can be explained in general by the fact that under discretion, a policymaker lacks the leverage to manage the economy she would enjoy under commitment. More specifically, the constraint on using the interest rate, captured by increasing the weight w i , simply results in a more volatile economy and, in equilibrium, both the variance of the inflation rate and that of the interest rate increase.
Now we can now assess the stabilization gains from commitment. Denote the expected inter-temporal utility loss at time t = 0 under the time-consistent discretionary policy and optimal commitment by Ω D 0 (0) and Ω C 0 (0) respectively. We compute these gains as equivalent permanent percentage increases in consumption and inflation, c gain e and π gain e respectively. From Appendix C of Levine et al. (2007b) , these are given by
In (46) in the absence of a ZLB constraint, we take Ω C 0 (0) =Ω C 0 (0) = 10.4 and Ω D 0 (0) = Ω D 0 (0) = 11.0 from the first rows of tables 4 and 5 respectively. With a ZLB constraint we take Ω C 0 (0) = 11.87 from the w i = 7 row of Table 5 and Ω D 0 (0) = 27.4 from the w i = 0 row of Table 6 .
Using these results Table 7 summarizes the gains from commitment measured by (46) with and without interest rate ZLB considerations. In the latter case these gains are very small -of the order of a 0.04% consumption equivalent gain. It is of interest to note here that this is close to the gains from stabilization per reported by Lucas (1987) . In our model these gains can be found from the minimum welfare costs under commitment. Corresponding to (46) these are
which from our results amounts to a 0.8% consumption equivalent increase. 24 23 It should be stressed that this is a model-specific result. In Levine et al. (2007b) , in a model with capital the trade-off seen under commitment re-emerges.
24 This figure are of the order of those reported in Levin et al. (2006) for a similar model but without nominal interest rate lower bound. The reason why they are much larger in these models is down to the Introducing the nominal interest rate ZLB constraint sees these stabilization gains from commitment increasing substantially to over a 1% consumption equivalent increase, a figure much larger than that found in most the current literature. Our finding endorses the conclusion reached by Adam and Billi (2007) , discussed in the Introduction, namely that the lower bound constraint on the nominal interest rate increases the gains from commitment several fold.
Time Inconsistency and Policy Coordination in the Open Economy
We now turn to open economy aspects of the time-inconsistency problem. Following the seminal contribution of Obstfeld and Rogoff (1996) , chapter 10, New Keynesian open economy DSGE modelling, the 'New Open Economy Macroeconomics', has been a highly active area. 25 Obstfeld and Rogoff developed a non-stochastic, perfect foresight twocountry general equilibrium model with first flexible prices, and then price-rigidity. This model formed the basis for a wave of stochastic general equilibrium models that have been used to examine the potential gains from monetary policy coordination. 26 .
Optimal policy can be formulated independently by each monetary authority. However
In addition to the time-inconsistency problem there is a second classical problem first raised by Hamada (1976) : in an open economy, rules designed for the single economy may perform badly in a world Nash equilibrium when all countries pursue similar optimal policies. In the open economy the optimal monetary policy requires all policymakers to cooperate, maximizing an agreed global welfare, and to be able to commit not just with respect to each other but collectively with respect to the private sector too. These considerations lead to a number of possible equilibria depending on whether policymakers cooperate and can commit to the private sector and whether they can commit with respect to each other (i.e., can cooperate).
Consider symmetrical equilibria in the sense that all authorities can either commit or not with respect to the private sector. In the absence of any commitment mechanism for players all authorities must independently pursue discretionary policies (non-cooperation with discretion (ND)). If authorities can cooperate (i.e., can commit to each other) and can commit with respect to the private sector, then the socially optimal policy with respect welfare costs of price and (in the model of the latter paper) wage inflation, not included in the Lucas calculations, and to the estimated variances of the shocks. 25 See also Obstfeld and Rogoff (2000) and a recent survey by Lane (1999) . 26 See, for example, Benigno and Benigno (2001) , Obstfeld and Rogoff (2002 ) Clarida et al. (2002 ), Pappa (2004 , Liu and Pappa (2005) , Batini et al. (2005) 20 to an agreed global objective function can be achieved (cooperation with commitment to the private sector, CC). The remaining possible equilibria are those where (for some reason) authorities can commit to each other but not to the private sector (cooperation with discretion, CD) or vice versa, they can commit to the private sector but not to each other (non-cooperation with commitment to the private sector, NC). Table 8 summarizes these four possibilities.
These linear-quadratic dynamic game equilibria are formulated in Levine and Currie (1987a) , Levine and Currie (1987b) , Currie and Levine (1993) , Currie et al. (1996) ).
General procedures, not specific to any one model, for their calculation and software for their computation have been developed (see Kemball-Cook et al. (1995) .) In a two-bloc model the potential gains from commitment in the absence of coordination can be quantified by comparing the welfare in equilibria NC and ND. These 'gains' can be negative: as in Levine and Currie (1987b) , for an ad hoc 'Old Keynesian' model commitment without coordination may be counterproductive. Similarly one can assess the potential gains from coordination in the absence of commitment by comparing equilibria CD and ND and revisit the possibility of counterproductive cooperation found by Rogoff (1985) .
To realize the full potential gain from monetary policy coordination between the two blocs requires a combination of commitment and coordination; i.e., equilibrium CC and and Benigno and Benigno (2001) show that CC can be sustained as an NC equilibrium by delegation to a central bank with an appropriate loss function. Finally Currie and Levine (1993) compare CC and ND, but using an ad hoc model and utility function.
These conclusions are based on either the earlier generation of ad hoc models and loss functions, or on very simple micro-founded models. In the words of Canzoneri et al. (2005) , "What is yet to come" is the reassessment of these gains using empirical DSGE models incorporating various persistence mechanisms, incomplete exchange rate pass-through, incomplete financial markets, 'home bias', a non-traded sector, wage stickiness and relaxing the assumption of complete information, all factors that could well affect both commitment and coordination gains. In particular:
Persistence Mechanisms and Calvo Contracts
In order to obtain a better fit with data output persistence can be incorporated by adding habit in consumption and/or labour supply and indexing into Calvo contracts (see Batini et al. (2005) ). As we have seen these may mean we can dispense with the ad hoc price indexation that has come under attack in the literature. Devereux and Engel (2002) in their solution to the 'exchange rate disconnect' puzzle propose three key elements of the solution: the possibility of local currency pricing (LCP); heterogeneity in the way exported goods are priced i.e. some involve LCP, whereas others involve producer currency pricing (PCP); thirdly, incomplete markets and 'noise traders' whose expectations are conditionally biased.
The Exchange-Rate Pass-Through Mechanism and Incomplete Markets

Home Bias
Households typically may have a preference for goods produced in the home country.
However Corsetti et al. (2002) shows that this is insufficient in its own right to explain why the correlation between relative consumption and the real exchange rate is negative for many countries.
Traded and Non-traded Sectors
This feature which introduces the Balassa-Samuelson effect is stressed in Corsetti and non-traded sectors accounts for both the exchange rate disconnect puzzle and a low degree of risk-sharing with a negative correlation between relative consumption and the real exchange rate. These features are combined with a significant (and negative) transmission of a productivity increase in one country.
Wage Stickiness
As Erceg et al. (2000) and Blanchard and Gali (2005) argue, wage plus price stickiness are necessary to avoid the implausible 'divine coincidence' property that stabilizing inflation also stabilizes the output gap. Note however that divine coincidence is also removed by other means, such as the ad hoc mark-up shocks that are typically added to the Phillips curves at the Bayesian estimation stage and by the non-separability of money and consumption.
Neo-Classical Models and DSGE Models with Partial Information
In the introduction in Collard and Dellas (2006) we noted how a Neo-Classical Lu- rests on the existence of forward-looking, rational agents, the use of micro-foundations which introduces more forward-looking behaviour, has increased its relevance.
The gains from commitment and how to sustain them will continue to preoccupy economists in all areas of the subject. For macroeconomists, perhaps the most fruitful area for future research will be in the open-economy aspects where two commitment problems arise: that between authorities such as central banks and that between these institutions and the private sectors. What is yet to come, then, is a study of of these issues in the context of the 'New Open Economy Macroeconomics.' baseline steady state except for rates of change which are absolute deviations. 29 Then the linearization takes the form: 
We can write this system in state space form as (29) and (30) where z t = [a t , g t , l t−1 , l t−1 , c t−1 ,ĉ t−1 , π t−1 ] is a vector of predetermined variables at time t and x t = [c t , π t ] are non-predetermined variables. Rational expectations are formed assuming an information set {z s , x s }, s ≤ t, the model and the monetary rule. Table 1 provides a summary of our notation. Tables 1 and 2 summarize the prior distributions, posterior means and medians and 90%
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confidence intervals for the eight model specifications. In Table 2 , the medians of ξ are obtained by using λ ≡
(1−βξ)(1−ξ) (1+βγ)ξ ; average contract lengths 
